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Kierkegaard’s Inverse D ialectic
by SYLVIA WALSH UTTERBACK
Distinctive to Kierkegaard’s thought is a form of dialectic which he called 
“inverse dialectic” (omvendt Dialektik) or “the dialectic of inversion” {Om- 
vendthedens Dialektik).1 In Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift Kierke­
gaard interpreted both Religiousness A and B in terms of the general formula 
for this dialectic, contrasting them to the aesthetic and the “directness” (Lige- 
fremhed) which characterizes that sphere.2 In later writings Kierkegaard 
associated inverse dialectic specifically with Christianity (det Christ elige), 
while continuing to acknowledge a certain amount of analogy to the Christian 
dialectic in other religious forms.3 Inverse dialectic thus played a crucial role 
in Kierkegaard’s effort to delineate the various stages of existence and to 
determine the distinctiveness of Christian existence. It provided a form 
whereby Kierkegaard could indicate both the similarity and the difference, 
the continuity and the discontinuity between the ethico-religious and the 
Christian. The intent here is to indicate the structure and function of this 
form of dialectic in Kierkegaard’s thought as it emerges in his understanding 
of dialectic, as it appears in his writings, and as it applies to the relation 
between ethico-religious and Christian existence.
I .
It is widely recognized that Kierkegaard distinguished existential or qualitative 
dialectic from logical and quantitative dialectic and that he emphasized the
1 Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, ed, by P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting, vols. I-XI 
(København: Gyldendal, 1909-48); vols. XII-XVI, ed. by Niels Thulstrup (København: 
Gyldendal, 1969-78), VIII 1 A 84, VIII 1 A 492, X 2 A 549, X 4 A 456. See also 
X 2 A 560, X 2 A 609, X 3 A 302, X 3 A 482, X 3 A 783, X 5 A 11. Hereafter 
cited as Pap.
2 Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Veerker, 3d ed., edited by A. B. Drachman, J. L. Heiberg, 
and H. O. Lange, 20 vols. (København: Gyldendal, 1962-64), 10: 120. Hereafter 
cited as S. V.
3 Pap. X 5 A 11, X 5 A 39.
former in his thought. Existential dialectic comes to expression in the 
awareness of a qualitative contradiction between one’s present condition and 
one’s existential telos and between the different qualities, capacities, or 
conditions that may be realized in human existence. The specific terms of 
qualitative dialectic thus vary, but they may be described in general as being 
either “positive” or “negative.” By “positive” Kierkegaard understood what 
should be “posited” (sat) or actualized in existence. The positive is associated 
with the infinite and the eternal, along with the concrete qualities which 
express these in existence. Not everything that is actually posited constitutes 
the positive. In Sygdommen til Dfiden, for example sin is viewed as a “posi­
tion,” meaning that it is not a given or constitutional condition in humanity, 
but something posited by human action.4 While sin is not a “negation,” 
indicating some lack of being, limitation, or definity in humanity, it is an act 
which should be “negated” by being overcome in existence.
Generally in a dialectical process one negates one thing in order to posit 
and affirm something else. In Om Begrebet Ironi Kierkegaard accepts 
Schleiermacher’s contention that Socrates was the “founder of dialectic” 
(Stifter af Diale ctiken), but he qualifies this claim by insisting that Socrates 
introduced only “negative dialectic” (negative Dialectik) in the form of irony.5 
Defining irony as “infinite absolute negativity” (uendelige absolute Nega- 
tivitet), Kierkegaard shows in his dissertation that Socrates’ irony was no mere 
rhetorical device, but constituted his essential standpoint toward existence.6 
Through irony Socrates was able to emancipate himself from the state or 
the established order of his time, but he was unable to posit anything by his 
negation. He possessed the beginning of infinite knowledge, but only in the 
form of possibility and as a limit. That is, he knew that the eternal is, but 
not what it is.7 The positive was constantly insinuated through his negativity, 
but it was continually restrained so as to remain wholly abstract, never re­
ceiving determinate form or becoming concrete.
Thus Kierkegaard concludes that Socrates possessed “the idea of dialectic” 
(Dialectikens Idee) -  the recognition that it involves both the negative and 
the positive -  but not “the dialectic of the Idea” (Ideens Diale ctik) -  a
4 5. V. 15: 148.
5 S. V. 1: 202, 186.
6 Ibid., pp. 274, 276.
7 Ibid., p. 201.
conception of the eternal in its positivity as well as in its negativity.8 Drawing 
support for his interpretation from Hegel, Kierkegaard claims that when 
Hegel called Socrates “the founder of morality” (Stifter af Moralen), this did 
not signify any positivity in Socrates.9 Inasmuch as Socrates* moralizing was 
only an individual activity and was essentially negative in character, 
emancipating the individual from the determinate, Kierkegaard thinks it 
belonged under Hegel’s category of Moralität, not of Sittlichkeit, the higher 
ethic wherein the individual is positively free.10 The latter constitutes what 
Kierkegaard, in agreement with Hegel, calls «the deeper positivity” (den 
dybere Positivitet), a positive state in which the individual is not merely freed 
from the finite, but freed in such a way that he or she is consciously and freely 
able to affirm.11 In Kierkegaard’s opinion, Socrates never achieved this deeper 
positivity. It was Plato who gave Socrates “the Idea” (Ideen), thereby trans­
forming his irony into a negative power in service to the positive and investing 
his thought with positive content.12 Kierkegaard accuses Hegel of gravitating 
toward a Platonic conception of Socrates through his claim that Socrates arrived 
at the Idea of the good in the form of the law. What Hegel failed to see, 
according to Kierkegaard, was that Socrates’ whole life was engaged in 
coming to the good, that the irony by which he negated the finite so as to 
arrive at the good was not a “mastered moment” (behersket Moment), but a 
continuous, life-long activity, the telos and significance of his existence.13 14
Although Kierkegaard did not think that irony was ever a “mastered 
moment” in the life of Socrates, he did believe that it should be mastered, 
that only then does irony acquire its “proper significance and true validity” 
(rette Betydning og sande Gyldighed) and the life of the individual become 
“correctly oriented” (rigtig stillet).u  “Irony,” he says, “is like the negative 
way, not the truth but the way” (Ironien er som det Negative Veien; ikke 
Sandheden, men Veien).15 As Kierkegaard developed his theory of existential 
dialectic in the stages of life, therefore, he envisioned a progressive, successive
8 Ibid., p. 202.
9 Ibid., p. 249.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 250.
12 Ibid., pp. 166, 163.
13 Ibid., p. 255.
14 Ibid., p. 328.
15 Ibid., p. 329.
movement out of the aesthetic through the negative, via irony, to the deeper 
positivity of the ethical, where one affirms one’s existence in its eternal 
validity and seeks to actualize the eternal in one’s life.
In respect to the form and direction of this movement, Kierkegaard’s view 
may be said to resemble that of Hegel. But Kierkegaard strongly disagreed 
with Hegel regarding the necessity of existential movement and regarding 
the way in which the deeper or higher positivity is brought about. As Kierke­
gaard rightly notes in Begrebet Angest, for Hegel negation is “the motive 
power which brings movement into everything“ {den fremskyndende Magt, 
der bringer Bevcegelse i Alt), both in logic and in existence.16 Earlier, in Om 
Begrebet Ironi, Kierkegaard admitted that in the sphere of reflection it is 
true that every thesis passes over into its opposite, but he maintained that in 
existence the process of reflection is often stopped in course by the particular 
subject, who may never make the next movement.17 Nothing happens in 
existence by necessity. Moreover, in Begrebet Angest Kierkegaard denies that 
any real movement takes place in logic, for everything logical simply is. The 
activity of becoming obtains only in existence. Logic contains at best only 
“immanent movement” {immanent Bevcegelse), which in a deeper sense is 
really no movement, since, according to Kierkegaard’s conception of logic, 
it remains within the category of thought, and the negative becomes a 
“vanishing factor” {det Forsvindende), i.e., it is annulled in the affirmation 
of a higher positive.18 Thus Kierkegaard denies that anything happens {skeer) 
or is posited {sat) in logic or in reality by negation. (The ironist, one may 
recall, “does not have the new within his power” {Ironikeren ikke bar det Nye 
i sin Magt), but possesses it only in the form of possibility.)19 Furthermore, 
Kierkegaard charges that Hegel, by erroneously regarding the negative as the 
producer of the higher positive, makes the negative a “counterposition” 
(Contra-Position).20 This relativizes the opposition between the terms of 
dialectic, whereas, in Kierkegaard’s view, it should be uncompromisingly 
maintained.
16 S.V. 6: 111.
17 S.V. 1: 231.
18 S.V. 6: 112.
19 S.V. 1: 277.
20 S.V. 6: 112.
II.
Inverse dialectic appears in Kierkegaard’s thought as the form taken by 
existential dialectic in the sphere of the ethical (understood broadly as 
encompassing the ethico-religious and the Christian modes of existence). Here 
the expression of the negative is neither an infinite activity, as in Socrates, 
nor a moment of passage, void of positivity and followed by the positive, as 
in Kierkegaard’s view of the movement from the aesthetic to the ethical. 
Rather, in the ethical sphere the negative is a constant and indirectly positive 
factor. The positive does not appear directly as the positive but is viewed as 
being in or recognized by the negative. A positive relation to the eternal is 
expressed and known through negative or converse forms. The positive is 
neither immediately present in the negative nor contained in it implicitly, as 
in Hegel’s view. The negative is a sign, not a producer, of the positive. It 
constitutes the medium through which the eternal is affirmed as a telos or 
experienced in human existence.
The designation “inverse dialectic” for this form of dialectic appears only 
in Kierkegaard’s journals, although in Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhand- 
linger he does refer to existential dialectic as having “direct” and “inverse” 
scales:
Som der paa et Thermometer er en Plus- og en Minus-Scala, saaledes er 
der ogsaa i det Dialektiske en ligefrem Scala og en Omvendthedens 
Scala. Men saaledes omvendt seer man sjeldent eller aldrig det Dialektiske 
benyttet i Menneskenes Tænkning over det at handle i Livet; man kommer 
ikke til det egentlige Problem. Menneskene kjende fordetmeste kun det 
ligefremme Dialektiske.21
The formula for inverse dialectic first appears in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig 
Efterskrift, where Johannes Climacus states that in the religious or ethico- 
religious sphere “the positive is recognized by the negative” (det Positive er 
kjendeligt paa det Negative)!22 Climacus claims that “the religious sphere 
constantly uses the negative as its essential form” (det Religieuse bruger be­
standigt det Negative som den væsentlige Form); “the negative does not 
appear once for all, and then the positive” (Det Negative er ikke eengang for
21 S. V. 15: 28.
22 S. V. 10: 120, 205, 206.
alle og saa det Positive); rather, “the positive is constantly in the negative” 
(det Positive er bestandigt i det Negative).23
Accordingly, Climacus views religious pathos as coming to expression in 
ethico-religious subjectivity or Religiousness A through the negative forms 
of resignation, suffering, and the consciousness of guilt. While the ideal task 
in life is to affirm both the finite and the infinite simultaneously, each with 
the appropriate passion, the religious individual seeks first to establish an 
absolute relation to the eternal through a renunciation of the finite (e.g., 
selfishness and worldliness), or what Climacus calls “dying away from im­
mediacy” (Afd0en fra Umiddelbarheden)2* Suffering becomes the essential 
expression of pathos in this attempt inasmuch as one is continually faced with 
the task of resignation. For as soon as one has succeeded in renouncing one's 
selfish attachment to relative or worldly ends, the process must be repeated; 
it is as though one gets no further along by one’s effort. Suffering thus 
expresses the religious individual’s sense of failure in bringing his or her 
existence into conformity with the eternal, as well as in finding a satisfactory 
external expression for the relationship to it. This consciousness of impotence 
culminates in “self-annihilation” (,Selvtilintetgjfirelsen), or the attempt, as 
it were, to put oneself out of the recognition that one is nothing before God -  
that one can do absolutely nothing of oneself to positively effect one’s own 
self-transformation.25 The consciousness of guilt becomes the decisive ex­
pression for such a relation to the eternal, manifesting that the relation takes 
the form of a misrelation. That is, in the consciousness of guilt one recognizes 
that one is not related to the eternal in such a way as to be close to it, but as 
remote as possible from it.
This sense of failure, impotence, and distance is intensified and qualified 
in Religiousness B through the consciousness of sin and the possibility of 
offense. Climacus points out that the difficulty for the religious individual 
lies not so much in the constant failure to combine the absolute and the 
finite, but in annulling the illusion that he or she can do it.26 So long as one 
assumes an immanent relation to the eternal this illusion is not absolutely 
dispelled. In Religiousness B one encounters the eternal as a reality outside
23 Ibid., p. 198.
24 Ibid., p. 119.
25 Ibid., p. 144.
26 Ibid., p. 166.
the self, no longer as a potentiality within oneself. This creates the possibility 
of offense inasmuch as it contradicts ones understanding of both the eternal 
and one’s essential relation to it. In the consciousness of sin one recognizes 
an absolute breach between oneself and the eternal, signifying that ones 
relation to the eternal is informed by a radical misrelation.
As inverse dialectic applies in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, there­
fore, the negative signifies a relation to the eternal, but in negative form. 
One experiences eternal blessedness by way of anticipation, holding on to it 
in Religiousness A via an assumed immanence of the eternal and becoming 
eternal in Religiousness B via a relationship to the deity in time. In both 
Religiousness A and B the relation to the eternal underlies or sustains the 
misrelation to it, but there is little development in this work of the positive 
aspects. Although Climacus characterizes Religiousness B as “paradoxical 
religiousness,” its paradoxicality has to do with the fact that one is related to 
the eternal in time, not with an inverse relation between the positive and the 
negative.
In his later work and journals Kierkegaard developed a more paradoxical 
conceptions of inverse dialectic and applied it specifically, though not ex­
clusively, to Christianity. In his journal Kierkegaard states that “the formula 
for the Christian is: the Christian is always the positive, which is recognized 
by the negative” (Formelen for det Christelige [er\: det Christelige er altid 
det Positive, der er kjendeligt paa det Negative).27 In another entry the 
formula is given as being “to relate oneself to a Higher so that the relation 
becomes suffering” {at forholde sig til et Høiere saaledes at Forholdet bliver 
Lidelse), followed by the recognition that non-Christians may also sustain 
such a relation:
Enhver derfor, der forholder sig til eet eller andet Høiere (selv om dette 
ikke er Christendommen) saaledes, at han lider derfor, han har en Analogie 
til det Christelige; men Christendommen er det naturligviis ikke, thi til 
Christendommen fordres, at det Høiere, for hvilket man lider, er Christen­
dommen.28
A broad association of inverse dialectic seems also to apply in Opbyggelige 
Taler i forskjellig Aand (in En Leiligheds-Talé) — composed in an ethical
27 Pap. X 4 A 456.
28 Pap. X 5 A 11.
mode which does not distinguish • between the ethico-religious and the 
Christian -  where “the individual” (den Enkelte) is characterized as a person 
whose vision has been formed so as “to look upon everything as inverted” 
(at betragte Alt omvendt)P In Christelige Taler one finds him saying virtually 
the same thing in a specifically Christian context: “Eternity knows only one 
method: to look at everything as inverted” (Evigheden kjender kun een 
Fremgangsmaade: at betragte Alt omvendt).29 30
In this inverse perspective Christianity's understanding of what constitutes 
the positive and the negative is seen to be diametrically opposite to that of 
the immediate (natural, merely human, pagan, worldly) understanding. What 
“the world” regards as positive, the Christian views as really negative, and 
what appears as negative to others is indirectly positive for the Christian.31 
It is through the latter sort of “negative” that the positive Christian character­
istics are recognized and expressed. Kierkegaard devotes a number of discourses 
specifically to the elucidation of this aspect of inverse dialectic, contrasting 
the Christian and worldly conceptions of poverty and wealth, lowliness and 
highness, weakness and strength, loss and gain, misfortune and good fortune.32 
The Christian is called upon to exercise “double awareness” (Dobbelt-Tanke) 
and “double vision” (Dobbeltsynet), seeing exaltation in lowliness, strength 
in weakness, etc.33
This has the effect of qualifying the process of reduplication (Fordoblelse) 
in Christianity. In general, reduplication means to exist in what one thinks,
i.e., to express the content of ones understanding in one's actions, so as to 
realize a fusion of thought and being in existence, not merely conceptually or 
abstractly, but actually.34 Reduplication of the Christian qualities and condi­
tions takes the form of an inverse dialectical movement in which one literally 
“works against oneself” at the same time one works to actualize a positive 
condition in one's life:
Enhver Stræben, der i at arbeide ikke anvender 1/4 1/3 2/3 <o: s: v:> af 
sin Kraft paa systematisk at modarbeide sig selv er væsentlig verdslig 
Stræben, i ethvert Fald ubetinget ikke reformatorisk.
29 S.V. 11: 123.
30 S. V. 13: 145.
31 S.V. 17: 131-132.
32 S.V. 13: 20-152.
33 Ibid., p. 55. See also S. V. 16: 188; S. V. 17: 133.
34 Pap. IX A 207.
Det <i> at arbeide (tillige) at modarbeide sig er Reduplicationen, er lige­
som det Tryk paa Ploven, som bestemmer Furens Dybde, medens en Stræ­
ben, der ikke i at arbeide (tillige) modarbeider sig selv blot er en Glatten- 
over... Det er atter her Forskjellen mellem det Ligefremme og det Om­
vendte, hvilket er det Dialektiske. Ligefrem at arbeide eller stræbe er at 
arbeide og stræbe. Omvendt er det: i at arbeide tillige at modarbeide 
sig selv.35
Thus in Christianity one does not strive directly to realize the eternal, but 
indirectly and inversely, striving in such a manner that Christian exaltation, 
for example, is gained by becoming lowly in the eyes of the world. Humanly 
understood, Christian striving seems to produce the opposite of the effect or 
condition desired. But Christianly understood, to work against oneself means 
to work against one’s goal only in the sense that one goes about attaining and 
expressing it in an opposite manner than the world would recommend or 
follow. A corollary of this is that one brings upon oneself opposition from 
the world as one succeeds in actualizing the Christian qualities in this indirect 
and inverse manner. Thus the more one becomes a Christian, the worse it 
will go for one in the world, and the less one will appear in the eyes of the 
world to be achieving or embodying that for which one strives.
Kierkegaards understanding of Christian existence is almost never simple 
or direct but complex, indirect, inverse, and dialectical, incorporating both 
positive and negative determinants which are related in a complementary 
manner. In its positive definition Christian existence is principally character­
ized by the consciousness of foregiveness, new life and hope, faith, love, joy, 
and consolation. But these are always experienced and recognized through 
negative determinants -  the possibility of offense, the consciousness of sin, 
self-renunciation or dying away from the world, and suffering. Kierkegaard’s 
main critique of Christendom was that it had collapsed the dialectic of 
Christianity, viewing Christian existence directly and superficially as the 
positive while virtually eliminating the negative factors that are essential in 
becoming a Christian. Consequently he sought to reintroduce the negative 
determinants or “subordinate clauses” {Undersætningen) through which the
35 Pap. X 2 A 560. See also X 3 A 28; S. V. 18: 67, note 1; S.V. 17: 99-100, where 
Kierkegaard characterizes Christ as working against himself and indicates that this is 
also the way of the Christian; and S.V. 12: 26-27, where Christian reduplication is 
associated with self-renunciation.
positive characteristics of Christian existence must be seen and expressed.36 
These can be considered here only in the barest outline, to illustrate their 
inverse dialectical significance in Kierkegaard’s later writings.
1. The Possibility of Offense. Ultimately Kierkegaard views Christianity 
as being entirely positive, offering love and forgiveness to humanity; but in 
its “first form,” or the form in which Christianity is first encountered in 
existence, it presents the possibility of offense, threatening to drive people 
away by the absolute, contradictory, and heterogeneous nature of Christ and 
Christian existence.
Christ presents the possibility of offense in basically two ways, by con­
stituting a “sign of contradiction” (Modsigelsens Tegn) through the composite 
and qualitatively contradictory make-up of his being and by colliding with 
the established order of his time.37 The latter was an accidental, vanishing 
form of offense, existing only for his contemporaries, though it receives a 
kind of vicarious continuation among his followers any time they resist the 
established order’s tendency toward self-deification and its insistence upon 
external conformity to its laws. The former possibility of offense in relation 
to Christ is essential, requiring that one sense that Christ is not what he im­
mediately appears to be, a lowly man, but qualitatively the inverse, the exalted 
deity. Neither lowliness nor loftliness in itself is offensive. Christ raises the 
possibility of offense only by the fact that his lowliness is inversely a sign 
of loftiness.
The Christian life also poses the possibility of offense, both to the Christian 
striver and to others. The remedy that Christ prescribes as salvation from 
offense constitutes the very thing which occasions the possibility of offense. 
For Christ’s help appears as affliction, his relief as a burden.38 One could 
perhaps understand life going badly for the offended person, but the dialectic 
of offense in Christianity is such that it is the believer for whom things go 
badly. Thus all the proper relationships and conditions are inverted.39 The 
believer’s understanding is brought to a standstill in that he or she cannot 
understand the inverseness of Christian existence, the why and wherefore of 
the requirements in relation to the benefits, for there seem to be no “where­
36 S.V. 17: 68.
37 S.V. 16: 86-87, 122.
38 Ibid., p. 115.
39 Ibid., p. 116.
fore” and no benefits.40 Just this stage of puzzlement is necessary before a 
person can be helped by Christ in the manner in which he offers help. Only 
when one is willing to accept Christianity on any terms, no matter if it is 
a help or a torment, does one properly attach oneself to Christ and perceive 
the benefits of the Christian life.41
Faith in this context means, on the one hand, to believe in possibility, and, 
on the other hand, to let go of probability. Defined ideally, faith is the opposite 
of despair and sin, constituting a self in which these conditions have been 
eradicated.42 But in existence faith always assumes a dialectical character, 
including in its definition the element of negativity in the form of an anti­
thesis to human understanding. Faith comes to expression in the will to 
believe. But what one is asked to believe is that with God all things are 
possible, and more specifically that forgiveness is possible, precisely at the 
moment when one is brought to the utmost extremity where, humanly speak­
ing, no posibility exists.43 In one sense, then, faith is the inverse of human 
understanding and expectation, but it also incorporates that understanding as 
a dialectical factor in itself. That is, faith is not merely to believe against the 
understanding. It is to fight for possibility, to have the will to procure possi­
bility or the will to believe, even though salvation seems impossible.44 One 
does not believe rightly or have a grasp of what is implied in a belief in 
possibility unless a sense of the impossibility of possibility is contained in that 
belief. Faith arises out of the tension of this dialectical moment and is 
maintained in the “double vision” (Dobbelt-Syn) of the content of faith as 
being, on the one hand, the negative absurd for one’s own reason and, on the 
other hand, the positive and true source of eternal blessedness.45
Inasmuch as becoming a Christian is to enter a way of life which may 
bring hardship and defeat just as much as victory and success, one must be 
prepared for either, letting go one’s human expectation of directly positive 
benefits to accrue from the Christian life in acceptance of whatewer comes. 
In fact, the probability that holds in relation to Christian faith is that one will 
be defeated by the world. If after encountering the possibilities of offense a
40 Ibid., p. 119.
41 Ibid., p. 115.
42 5*. V. 15: 136.
43 Ibid., p. 95.
44 Ibid.
45 Pap. X 2 A 592.
person still desires to come to Christ and to be helped by him in the manner 
in which his help is offered, then he or she will find the consolation, joy, and 
benefits of the Christian life. The possibility of offense assures, however, that 
these positive aspects of Christianity are not understood as the world under­
stands them and that it is only after the human understanding has been con­
founded by the inverseness of Christ and Christian existence that the positive 
appears indirectly in the negative. The possibility of offense thus plays an 
indirectly positive role in bringing one to faith and remains a constant factor 
in it. Only by facing and overcoming the possibility of offense throughout life 
does one exist in faith.
2. The Consciousness of Sin. The consciousness of sin, like the possibility 
of offense, is dialectical in nature. It may function in either a negative or an 
indirectly positive capacity, leading one away from faith in the continuation 
and potentiation of sin or figuring importantly in its forgiveness and an­
nihilation. As described in Sygdommen til Døden, the consciousness of sin 
signifies positively that one exists before God or with a conception of God, 
which serves as the measure of one's projected selfhood.46 The effect of his 
awareness, however, is seen to be the establishment of a sense of distrance from 
God, as in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. The insight to be gained 
from one's relation to God is not of one’s relative likeness to God, but con­
versely of one’s unlikeness to deity. Sin posits an infinite qualitative difference 
between humanity and God. The consciousness of sin is the consciousness 
of that difference.
In Christelige Taler, however, Kierkegaard introduces a form of “inverse 
comparison” {omvendte Sammenligning) which significantly qualifies the 
way in which this sense of distance and difference from God is understood 
in Christianity. Whereas in “direct comparison” {ligefremme Sammenligning) 
“likeness is the point of departure for determining difference” {Ligheden er 
Udgangspunktet for Forskjelligheden), in inverse comparison “everything is 
inverted” {Alt er vendt om) so that “difference is the point of departure for 
determining likeness” {Forskjelligheden er Udgangspunktet for Ligheden).47 
Accordingly, in Kierkegaard's Communion discourses the Christian's sense of 
distance and difference from God is seen paradoxically as a sign of closeness 
and likeness. This inversion occurs in the transformation of the consciousness
46 S. V. 15: 133.
47 S.V. 13: 139.
of sin into a contrite consciousness or “anguished conscience“ {cengstende 
Samvittighed). In this form the consciousness of sin expresses not merely an 
acute sense of separation from God but also sorrow over the fact of that 
separation.48 The expression of negative pathos in the forms of repentance 
and confession is, in Kierkegaard’s view, a prerequisite for the forgiveness of 
sin. Penitence or sorrow over sin is the demand of the gospel; forgiveness is 
the promise of the gospel.49 The consciousness of sin does not in itself bring 
about forgiveness, but is characterized rather by a sense of one’s inhability to 
do anything to attain forgiveness. Corresponding to the realization that one 
can do “less than nothing” (mindre end intet) as regards one’s redemption, 
however, is the positive assurance that Christ has done everything to secure 
it.50 The admission of impotence is a sign that one loves Christ much.51
The appropriate posture of penitence is that of a contrite heart that 
condemns itself, yet it is precisely in such a posture that one most resembles 
God. For the greatness of humanity is manifested in the greatness of its heart, 
which consists in being a contrite heart that condemns itself rather than one 
which elevates itself in direct comparison with God, or which measures the 
greatness of God on a scale with a positive view of itself.52 Similarly, in 
recognizing how far away from God one stands and in being humbled by this 
recognition, one comes near to God.53 As examples of this paradoxical posture 
of faith Kierkegaard points particularly to the publican (Luke 18: 13) and 
the woman who was a sinner (Luke 7: 4) 54 In another discourse he puts 
forth the latter as the “pattern of piety” (.Forbillede i Henseende til Fromhed) 
in her expression of absolute sorrow over her sin.55
3. Self-renunciation and Dying Away from the World. Kierkegaard views 
Christian love as coming to expression in self-renunciation, and new life and 
hope as issuing from dying away from the world. Contrasting Christian love 
to immediate forms of love, Kierkegaard shows in Kjerlighedens Gjerninger 
that Christian love is self-renouncing love, or love in which one renounces
48 Ibid., pp. 247, 251.
49 Ibid., p. 251.
50 Ibid., p. 281.
51 S.V. 14: 195.
52 S. V. 13: 275.
53 S.V. 14: 187. See also S.V. 13: 275.
54 Ibid., pp. 183, 193.
55 S.V. 17: 13.
selfishness in love for one’s neighbor.56 Self-renunciation does not preclude 
the expression of proper self-love or the forming of special relationships, but 
it does require that one allows one’s God-relation to penetrate and become 
the middle term in every love relation. The true conception of what it means 
to love another human being is to help that person to love God. Since in 
Kierkegaard’s view “love is God” {Kjerligheden er Gud), this means that the 
object of every love relationship is love itself rather than either party in the 
relation.57 Christianity seeks to transform every love relation into sacrificial 
love, teaching both the lover and the beloved to help each other to love rather 
than to seek to be loved through their relation with one another. Christian 
transformation consists in being made wholly an active power in the service 
of God or love, of becoming dedicated to the well-being of others rather than 
to one’s own self-elevation and promotion in the world.
This ethic of transformation has the effect of significantly qualifying the 
Christian dialectic with respect to the natural, pagan, worldly, and merely 
human. While Christianity stands uncompromisingly opposed to all of these 
in their unqualified form, the intent of the dialectic points beyond mere 
differentiation and opposition to an eventual union of the natural and the 
spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, the human and the Christian through 
the transforming power of self-renouncing love.
On the other hand, serious consequences inevitably result from the attempt 
to inform one’s temporal relationships with Christian love. The Christian 
faces “double danger” (Dobbelt-Faren), or opposition from the world as well 
as inward spiritual conflict.58 Thus one finds that Christianity makes life 
difficult, dangerous, and unhappy. The Christian is able to assert a new vitality 
over against his og her previous life of selfishness and worldliness and over 
against both human hope and despair. He or she is able to hold to the 
possibility of the good, the hope of reconciliation with humanity, and the 
victory of love in the world. In becoming a new being in Christ, however, 
one must learn to live in the world as a “deceased person” {Afdøde) and 
voluntary accept the negative consequences that ensue with the Christian 
life.59
56 5. V. 12: 57, 59.
57 Ibid., p. 120.
58 Ibid., pp. 186—188.
59 S.V. 17: 116; S. V. 12: 131.
4. Suffering. Suffering thus constitutes the crowning mark of Christian 
existence in inverse form. Suffering is not only a sign that one is related to 
the eternal, but is the means by which the Christian experiences joy and 
consolation in the world. One cannot place oneself beyond suffering in life, 
but one can find internal freedom, victory, and joy within it.60 These may be 
gained by patiently accepting suffering, by inverting its meaning so as to take 
pride in it, and by knowing what suffering signifies -  that one has chosen 
rightly in following Christ, that the burden can be light though the suffering 
is heavy, that suffering trains for eternity, etc.61 In Opbyggelige Taler i for- 
skjellig Aand (.Lidelsernes Evangelium) Kierkegaard finds numerous occasions 
for joy in the strife of suffering.62 He continues to sound out “joyful notes” 
(.Stemninger) in this strife in the Christelige Taler, proclaiming the triumphant 
edifying, and purifying nature of suffering and expounding the various 
inversions that characterize Christian suffering — that suffering does not take 
away hope but recruits it, that the poorer one becomes the richer one makes 
others and oneself as well, that the weaker one becomes the stronger one 
becomes, that to lose is to gain, and that misfortune is good fortune.63 In 
another discourse from 1849 Kierkegaard envisions the Christian life as not 
merely combining joy and suffering, but as enabling one to be uncondi­
tionally joyful even in times of deepest sorrow.64
Just as there is joy to be found in suffering, so also there is consolation 
for suffering in Christianity, but it is always given in correspondence to the 
rigorousness of Christianity contained in the requirement that one die away 
from the world and endure the negative consequences of that act.65 6Then rule 
becomes: “the greater rigorousness -  the more consolation” (Loven er: jo 
stfirre Strenghed -  jo mere Tr0st).GQ Christian consolation is intended primarily 
to relieve the anguished conscience over sin; only secondarily does it have 
to do with the common suffering of life. When consolation is extended for 
temporal distress it is usually offered for suffering which one endures in the 
world as a result of ones God-relation. There is, then, a form of inverse
60 S. V. 11: 110, 284.
61 Ibid., pp. 110, 303, 199.
62 Ibid., pp. 203-313.
63 S’. V. 13: 95-152.
64 S’. V. 14: 158-166.
65 Pap. X 3 A 166.
66 Pap. X 3 A 130. See also X 2 A 185.
dialectic operative in suffering and consolation. One usually turns to 
Christianity for help in order to bear ordinary suffering in life and then 
discovers, first, that consolation is not offered for the kind of suffering for 
which one seeks comfort and relief; and second, that when one acquires a 
consciousness of sin and seeks Christianity’s reassuring word about judgment, 
one has to suffer because of this comforting word. Thus the opposite of what 
one would normally expect occurs. The more one succeeds in meeting the 
requirements of Christianity, the more one has to suffer than be relieved of 
suffering. Instead of being a comforter, God appears to be a deceiver.67 
Christian consolation thus presents the possibility of offense. In Cloristelige 
Taler Kierkegaard says:
Thi det Christelige begynder just egentligen der, eller det egentlige Christe- 
lige begynder just der, hvor den menneskelige Utaalmodighed, hvad den 
end havde af virkelig Lidelse at klage over, vilde finde denne uendelig 
forøget -  ved Trøsten, ja -  ved Trøsten til at fortvivle over; thi verdsligt 
er den christelige Trøst langt mere til at fortvivle over end den tungeste 
jordiske Lidelse og den største timelige Ulykke.68 
The misery of spiritual suffering over sin, dying away from the world, and 
the temporal suffering which helps one in the task constitutes a misery which 
the natural human being would altogether prefer to remain ignorant of and 
to avoid in life.69
If consolation brings suffering, the inversion also obtains that the sufferer 
is the one most qualified to bring consolation to others. Instead of seeking 
consolation for oneself, the Christian is admonished to console others in 
theirs.70 Yet it is precisely in comforting others that one finds consolation for 
one’s own sorrows. Christ is “absolutely the greatest sufferer of whom it is 
true ... that he has absolutely no other consolation than this: to console 
others” {Den er ubetinget den meest Lidende, om hvem det .. .  i Sandhed er 
sandt, at han ubetinget ingen anden Trøst har end den: at trøste André). In 
him suffering reaches its highest, but also its limit, “where everything is 
inverted” {hvor Alt vender sig om).71 But the requirement extends to his
67 Pap. X 3 A 359.
68 S. V. 13: 97.
69 Pap. X 3 A 130.
70 Pap. X 3 A 131, X 3 A 167, VIII 1 A 493.
71 S.V. 14: 177.
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followers as well. Consolation consists in consoling rather than in being 
consoled.
When suffering becomes the sign of a God-relation, it is just then that 
consolation is most needed. In his journal Kierkegaard says:
“Naar Kjendet paa Guds-Forholdet er Lykke, Medgang, jordisk Velsignelse, 
i det Høieste med let Islæt af Gjenvordigheder uden hvilke nu engang intet 
Menneske-Liv er: saa behøves ingen Aand der er Trøsteren.”72 73
But when one must suffer as a result of relating oneself to God, then one 
needs Christianity’s consoling word, which says, “‘think on him,4 for this is 
precisely what Christ has predicted and what his life expressed” (“minde ham 
om ” at dette jo er hvad Christus har forudsagt og hans Liv udtrykt) P  
Through its negative determinants Christian existence thus takes on the 
appearance of being repulsive, unhappy, difficult, dangerous, and painful 
instead of attractive, pleasant, easy, safe, and carefree. It is a life in which 
one must constantly work against oneself in the world, losing rather than 
succeeding, becoming poor rather than rich, giving rather than receiving, 
loving rather than being loved, consoling rather than being consoled, and 
accepting new suffering rather than being relieved from the old. Yet from 
the Christian point of view these negative characteristics and consequences 
are to be regarded inversely as aids toward willing the good and as a source 
of strength and deeper insight into the true nature of the eternal, life, love, 
hope, faith, Christ, and God. The awareness that the negative aspects of 
Christian existence bear an inverse, paradoxical signification converts the un­
happiness, suffering, and rigorousness of life into joy and victory, enabling 
one to become essentially indifferent to the trials of existence.
III.
Insofar as both ethico-religious and Christian existence are characterized by 
inverse dialectic, it provides the form by which the similarity and continuity 
between these two forms of existence become evident. Both relate to the 
positive through negative forms; both express a sense of separation and im­
potence in relation to the eternal; and both involve renunciation and suffering. 
But Christian existence is also seen by Kierkegaard to be quite different from
72 Pap. X 5 A 49.
73 Ibid.
the ethico-religious. Inverse dialectic constitutes a means whereby the 
discontinuity and distinctiveness of Christianity are expressed inasmuch as the 
ethico-religious does not incorporate the paradoxicality, the intensity, the 
degree, and the most decisive forms of negative expression found in 
Christianity.
The distinctiveness of Christian existence is established foremost through 
the consciousness of sin and the possibility of offense. The consciousness of 
sin both intensifies religious pathos and introduces a different estimate of the 
degree of one’s breach with the eternal. It incorporates the element of para­
doxicality, expressing both separation from the eternal and closeness to it, 
by taking the form of a contrite consciousness. The possibility of offense is 
not possible in ethico-religious existence because this form of existence lies 
within immanence, i.e., it affirms the essential possession of the eternal in 
the form of potentiality. The possibility of offense, in Kierkegaard’s view, 
results only from an “autopathic collision” {autopathiske Collision), or a 
collision with the eternal outside the self, as occurs in Christianity.74
In respect to the other negative determinants of Christianity the uniqueness 
of Christian existence is not so clearly apparent since the ethico-religious is 
also characterized by renunciation and suffering. Christian self-renunciation 
is distinguished from ethico-religious or purely human self-renunciation in 
two ways, by the purity of motivation with which it is performed and by the 
courage and willingness with which the act and its consequences are embraced. 
Like the Christian, the ethico-religious individual is willing to give up 
selfishness and worldliness for the sake of the good. But as Kierkegaard sees 
it, the ethico-religious individual expects some positive reward, such as honor 
and approval, in return for self-sacrifice.75 The Christian in venturing to 
express self-renouncing love encounters opposition from the world and receives 
no reward, or rather, receives as a reward the opposite of what could be 
expected in the performance of sacrifice -  misunderstanding and scorn. 
Willingness to submit to opposition from the world constitutes the decisive 
Christian expression of self-renunciation.76 While the ethico-religious in­
dividual may also encounter opposition from the world, a collision is not 
anticipated, since it is assumed that his or her basic understanding of love is
74 S.V. 10: 251.
75 S. V. 12: 129, 189.
76 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
essentially held in common with others.77 The Christian, on the other hand, 
expresses self-renouncing love with open eyes, fully expecting opposition from 
the world and freely choosing to submit to it.78 The Christian not only 
anticipates collision where the ethico-religious does not; his or her collision 
is precisely with the purely human conception of love and sacrifice.79 Kierke­
gaard regards the ethico-religious as movement “on the way” (underveis) 
toward the expression of true love and sacrifice, but it “gets stuck half way” 
0den bliver staaende paa Halvveien) inasmuch as it remains along with im­
mediacy “within the limits of a finite range of vision” (indenfor Menneskelig­
hedens Synskreds).80 In Christianity self-renunciation and dying away from 
the world involve not only a dying away from immediacy, but from immanent 
presuppositions and viewpoints as well. Whereas the ethico-religious 
culminates in the failure of the individual to achieve inward tranformation, 
in Christianity one is made a new being who manifests transformed vision, 
vitality, love, and hope.
In Indøvelse i Christendom Kierkegaard claims that specifically Christian 
suffering is a “whole musical tone deeper” (en heel Tonart dybere) than 
common human suffering.81 Christian suffering is distinguished by a number 
of factors: by the paradoxical interpretation of suffering noted earlier, by 
the patience and voluntariness with which suffering is endured, by the fact 
that it is suffering in likeness to Christ for the sake of the Word, and by its 
contradictory character and consequences, which present the possibility of 
offense.82 Christian suffering is external suffering incurred as a result of 
coming to Christianity, in contradiction to what one would ordinarily expect. 
For instead of receiving alleviation from suffering as a result of becoming 
a Christian, one meets with a seemingly endless perpetuation and increase 
of it. Ethico-religious suffering, by contrast, is internal suffering which results 
from the religious individual’s failure to bring his or her existence into con­
formity with the eternal. The Christian also experiences inward religious 
suffering, but it derives from the recognition that one is a sinful person who 
is incorrectly related to God, not merely from the fact one is subject to the
77 Ibid., p. 113.
78 Ibid., p. 188.
79 Ibid., p. 113.
80 Ibid., pp. 130, 190.
81 S.V. 16: 110.
82 Ibid., pp. 109-116, 167.
conditions of temporality, which make the experience of eternal blessedness 
continually elusive.
Finally, Christian existence acquires an indirect, paradoxical “inverse re- 
cognizability” (omvendte Kendelighed) through external suffering which 
serves to distinguish it from both the genuine form of “hidden inwardness” 
(.skjulte Inderlighed) in ethico-religious existence and its distorted form in 
Christendom.83 The fact of being a Christian is made evident not by external 
acts and appearances which bring honor and esteem, but by the opposition 
one suffers in the world. The more truth there is in ones claim to be a 
Christian, the more opposition one will encounter, and the truth of ones 
claim is made recognizable by the fact.84
In incorporating an external dimension and determination of Christian 
existence through self-renunciation and suffering, Kierkegaard's understanding 
of Christianity undergoes significant expension. V. Lindstrom has suggested 
that Kierkegaard moved from an internal to an external determination of the 
Christian life form, and from a positive to a negative conception of Christian 
self-renunciation.85 He thinks Kierkegaard gradually came to associate 
Christian self-renunciation strictly with suffering, while self-renunciation in 
the form of disinterested service to the good -  initially identified, in Kjerlig- 
hedens Gjerninger, as Christian self-renunciation -  became relegated to the 
level of human self-renunciation. Lindstrom admits that in Kjerlighedens 
Gjerninger Kierkegaard views opposition from the world as an unavoidable 
consequence of Christian self-renunciation; but he does not recognize that 
already in this book Kierkegaard views voluntary submission to such opposi­
tion as constituting the decisive form of Christian self-renunciation. Referring 
to the “double-danger” of external as well as internal conflict in Christian 
existence, Kierkegaard maintains that “as soon as the double-mark is missing 
the self-renunciation is not Christian self-renunciation” (saasnart Dobbelt- 
Mcerket mangier, saa er Selv-Fornegtelsen ikke christelig Selvfornegtelse).86 
Certainly the external constitutes a new element in Kierkegaard's writings
83 Ibid., pp. 199-201.
84 Ibid., p. 199.
85 Valter Lindstrom, Efterfôljelsens Teologi hos Soren Kierkegaard (Stockholm: Svenska 
Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokfôrlag, 1956), pp. 122-123, 138, 140-141, 147-152, 161.
86 S. V. 12: 189- See also S. V. 16: 207, which refers to Kjerlighedens Gjernmger as 
having defined Christian self-renunciation decisively in terms of “double danger.”
after Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, but, strictly speaking, it does not 
represent a shift or change in Kierkegaard's point of view. Kierkegaard does 
not discard the inward definition of a Christian self-renunciation and suffering, 
but adds the external to the internal, the outward response commensurable 
with inwardness.87 In like manner, he does not shift from a positive con­
ception of Christian self-renunciation to a negative one. In the context of 
inverse dialectic, sacrifice and suffering are indirectly positive as well as 
negative; and disinterested service to the good is (humanly understood) nega­
tive and only indirectly positive.
The notion of inverse dialectic thus provides a form whereby Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the relation between the positive and the negative and 
between the ethico-religious and the Christian may be considerably clarified. 
While Kierkegaard wished to claim a qualitative distinctiveness for Christian 
existence, he did not regard it as being so unique as to have nothing in 
common with other forms of religious existence. The fundamental similarity 
between the ethico-religious and the Christian in Kierkegaard’s thought con­
sists in the fact that both relate to the eternal through negative forms. How­
ever, Kierkegaard came to view the negative in Christianity as constituting, 
like Christ, a “sign of contradiction,” paradoxically signifying the opposite 
of what it appears. The negative in Christianity also includes forms and 
aspects which, in Kierkegaard’s opinion, are not present in the ethico-religious. 
While the positive and negative determinants Kierkegaard associates with 
Christian existence may be characteristic of it (and this is of course open for 
debate), they may not be as distinctive to Christianity as Kierkegaard thought. 
Only a rigorous examination of Kierkegaard’s thought in the light of modern 
studies in the history of religions can determine that.
87 Kierkegaard sometimes refers to Christian self-renunciation in terms of dying away from 
selfishness and worldliness in disinterested service to the good (see S.V. 13: 165, 
170-172, 177; S.V. 17: 115-116, 120; Pap. IX A 283); at other places he defines it 
in terms of voluntary sacrifice and suffering (see S.V. 13: 210-219; S.V. 16: 207, 210; 
S.V. 17: 224; Pap. X 4 A 553). These are not seen as in any way incompatible or 
contradictory. One may find Kierkegaard speaking of both forms of self-renunciation 
in the same book, even within the same part of a book.
